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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
v. 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20070328-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari to review a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming defendant's sentence on conviction 
of theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404.1 This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court granted certiorari to review this question: 
Whether the court of appeals correctly construed statutory provisions 
governing the imposition of consecutive sentences. 
1
 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the 2004 West 
edition. 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness, including the "standard of review which it applied to the ruling of the 
trial court/7 State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, If 11,103 P.3d 699. The underlying issue is 
one of statutory interpretation, which this Court will review "for correctness, 
affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusions/7 State v. Gallegos, 
2007 UT 81 ,18 , - R 3 d - . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions are relevant to this case. The complete text 
of these sections is attached as addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). 
(I) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty 
of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record 
and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively 
to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or 
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11), (12)(e). 
(II) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement 
after having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a 
hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to 
revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
2 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at 
the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause 
or warrant by the court. 
[12] (e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, 
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Theft case (the instant case). Defendant was charged with a theft for hire. (R. 
3-4, 17). He and two other men broke into a model home and removed 
approximately $13,000 worth of furnishings, for which defendant was paid $1,000. 
Id. On 4 December 2003, defendant pled guilty to one count of theft, a third degree 
felony (R. 16-23). Judge Noel sentenced him to a suspended prison term of zero to 
five years and placed him on probation for eighteen months under the supervision 
of Adult Probation and Parole (R. 66-67; 55:14-15). 
Robbery case (the second case). Two months later, defendant robbed Dr. 
John's Lingerie and Novelty Store at gunpoint (R. 27). He was caught soon 
thereafter, and on 16 August 2004, was convicted of two counts of aggravated 
3 
robbery with firearm enhancements (R. 38). On 4 October 2004 Judge Atherton 
sentenced him to prison for the robbery convictions (R. 55:18-19). 
Theft case revisited. On or about 15 September 2004 —after defendant was 
convicted in the robbery case but before he was sentenced — Adult Probation and 
Parole filed a Progress/Violation Report. (R. 38-39).2 On 6 December 2004— after 
defendant was sentenced in the robbery case by Judge Atherton—he appeared 
before Judge Reese for a probation revocation hearing on his theft conviction (R. 42; 
55:17). Defendant admitted violating his probation, and Judge Reese accordingly 
revoked probation (R. 42; 55:18). Judge Reese noted that defendant's probation 
violation concerned "serious violent charges apparently involving firearms" (R. 
55:19). He decided "that it would be just in [his] judgment to . . . run this charge 
consecutively with the others" (R. 55:19). 
Judge Reese signed the sentencing minutes and entered them in the record (R. 
42-43, addendum B). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 45). 
The court of appeals' ruling. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. 
See State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 68,157 P.3d 809 (addendum C). The majority 
held that Judge Reese, who revoked defendant's probation, had authority to 
determine concurrency. Under Utah statutory law, the majority reasoned, a 
2
 The document appears in the record and is dated 15 September 2004, but was 
not date-stamped by the district court clerk. See R. 38-39. 
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sentencing court may order a sentence to run consecutively with a sentence in 
another case only if the defendant is "already serving" that other sentence. Id. at f^ 
15. Because defendant's theft sentence had been suspended, he "was not already 
serving a sentence at the time of his [robbery] sentencing hearing before Judge 
Atherton." Id. at ^ 16. Therefore, Judge Atherton lacked the authority to address 
the question of concurrency when she sentenced defendant on the robbery 
conviction. Id. However, defendant "was serving his aggravated robbery sentences 
at the time Judge Reese sought to execute Defendant's suspended theft sentence." 
Id. Consequently, Judge Reese was required to, and properly did, determine 
concurrency at the time he revoked defendant's probation on the theft conviction. 
Id. 
The dissent argued that only Judge Atherton, in the second case, had authority 
to determine concurrency. "Judge Reese lacked authority to order Defendant's 
sentences to run consecutively. Rather, Judge Reese could only execute the 
suspended prison sentence originally imposed for Defendant's theft conviction." 
Id. at f 18 (Davis, J., dissenting). On the other hand, in the dissent's view, "[s]ince 
probation is a sentence that Defendant is already serving, Judge Atherton could 
have considered the theft conviction when sentencing Defendant for his aggravated 
robbery convictions." Id. at If 23. 
5 
This Court granted certiorari to consider "[w]hether the court of appeals 
correctly construed statutory provisions governing the imposition of consecutive 
sentences/7 Order of 2 August 2007, Case No. 20070328-SC 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The question posed by the instant appeal is which of the two courts that 
sentenced defendant had the jurisdiction and the practical ability to impose 
consecutive sentences. Defendant contends that Judge Atherton, when sentencing 
defendant on the robbery conviction, could have run his robbery sentence 
consecutive or concurrent to his term of probation in the theft case. On the contrary, 
the issue was not yet ripe when Judge Atherton sentenced defendant; therefore, 
Judge Reese properly determined concurrency after revoking defendant's probation 
and executing the sentence previously imposed. 
A sentencing court must determine whether any sentences it imposes will run 
consecutively or concurrently with any other sentence the defendant is already 
serving. This raises the question of whether an offender serving probation is already 
serving his sentence. Utah statutory law is not consistent on whether an offender 
on probation is serving his sentence, although the better reasoned view is that 
probation is not a sentence but the suspension of a sentence. Statutory law is clear, 
however, that after a probation violation report is filed, time spent outside of 
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confinement does not count as serving probation. Thus, even if an offender serving 
his probation is simultaneously serving his sentence, after a probation violation 
report is filed, he is doing neither. That was defendant's status at the time Judge 
Atherton sentenced him. Thus, he was not already serving his sentence in the instant 
case at the time Judge Atherton sentenced him. She was not, therefore, in a position 
to determine concurrency. 
The concurrency question ripened only after Judge Reese revoked defendant's 
probation in the instant (theft) case and executed his previously imposed sentence. 
Before that time, any concurrency determination that Judge Atherton might make 
would have been contingent upon Judge Reese's revocation of probation. When 
defendant appeared at Judge Reese's probation revocation hearing, however, he was 
already serving his sentence in the robbery case; hence, Judge Reese was able and 
in fact required to determine whether the theft sentence he had just executed would 
run consecutively or concurrently with the robbery sentence. 
However this Court resolves the question of which court has the jurisdiction 
and obligation to decide concurrency, one thing is clear: one court or the other must 
do it. Because the Legislature has repealed the historical presumption in favor of 
concurrent sentences, without a judicial determination of concurrency the Board of 
Pardons and Parole is left without guidance necessary to calculate an inmate's term. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
WHEN A PROBATIONER VIOLATES THE TERMS OF HIS 
PROBATION BY COMMITTING A SECOND CRIME, THE COURT 
REVOKING PROBATION IN THE FIRST CASE PROPERLY 
DETERMINES WHETHER THE SENTENCES IN THE TWO CASES 
SHOULD RUN CONSECUTIVELY OR CONCURRENTLY 
Defendant claims that "trial courts cannot impose consecutive sentences 
following probation revocation under Utah's statutory scheme/7 Br. Aplt. at 5 
(capitalization, boldface, and underlining omitted). He argues that the sentencing 
court must make the concurrency election at the time it orders probation, and "upon 
revocation of probation, a trial court is mandated to execute the sentence previously 
imposed/ ' Br. Aplt. at 4. Defendant claims that trial courts can and do order a 
sentence to run consecutively "with a previously imposed sentence of probation/7 
Br. Aplt. at 15. Thus, he reasons, while his sentences could have been run 
consecutively, it was Judge Atherton (in the second case), not Judge Reese (in the 
instant case), who had the authority to do it. Id. 
A. When defendant was sentenced in the robbery case, he was not 
serving his sentence in the instant case, because he was on 
probation and a probation violation report had been filed. 
The question posed by the instant appeal is which of the two courts that 
sentenced defendant had the jurisdiction and the practical ability to impose 
consecutive sentences. Defendant and the court of appeals dissent take the view that 
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Judge Atherton, when sentencing defendant on the robbery conviction, could have 
run his robbery sentence consecutive or concurrent to his term of probation in the 
theft case. The State and the court of appeals majority take the view that the issue 
was not yet ripe when Judge Atherton sentenced defendant, and that only Judge 
Reese, after revoking defendant's probation and executing the sentence previously 
imposed, was in a position to determine whether defendant's robbery sentence and 
theft sentence should run consecutively or concurrently. 
This Court will 'Took first to the statute's plain language to determine its 
meaning/' Board ofEduc. of Jordan School Dist v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, f 9, 
94 P.3d 234 It will "read the plain language of a statute. . . as a whole and interpret 
its provisions in harmony with other provisions in the same statute." State v. 
Gallegos, 2007 UT 81 t 12 (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 7, 162 P.3d 1099 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The statute should be given a "reasonable and 
sensible construction." State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 
313 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). "The plain language controls the interpretation 
of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity [does the court] look beyond the plain 
language to legislative history or policy considerations." Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2, If 13, 993 P.2d 207. 
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A sentence in one case may be run consecutively to a sentence in another case 
only if the defendant is already serving the other sentence. Utah statutory law 
requires the sentencing court to determine whether the sentence being imposed will 
run consecutively to any other sentences the defendant is already serving: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty 
of more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or 
consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record 
and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or 
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1). 
The concurrency statute raises the question of whether an offender on probation 
is " already serving" his sentence. Probation is expressly authorized by statutory 
law, which provides that after a defendant pleads or is found guilty, "the court may, 
after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the 
defendant on probation." § 77-18-1 (2)(a). 
When defendant was originally sentenced in the instant (theft) case, he had not 
been convicted or sentenced for another crime. Thus, the parties agree, he was not 
"already serving" any other sentence. Consequently, Judge Noel could make no 
determination about whether the sentence would run concurrent or consecutive 
with any other sentences. However, two months later, defendant robbed Dr. John's 
10 
Lingerie and Novelty Store (R. 27). On 4 October 2004, Judge Atherton sentenced 
him to concurrent prison terms for the two resulting robbery convictions (R. 55: 
18-19). 
Defendant argues that Judge Atherton could have run defendant's sentences 
on the robbery convictions consecutive to his probation in the instant (theft) case 
because, as a probationer, defendant was "already serving" his theft sentence. § 76-
3-401(l)(b); Br. Aplt. at 12-16; see also Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P.2d 
1020,1021 (Utah 1968) (stating in dicta that a probationer "is deemed to be actually 
serving the sentence imposed"). 
On the contrary, when defendant was sentenced in the robbery case, he was not 
"already serving" his theft sentence for purposes of the concurrency statute for two 
reasons. First, his theft sentence had been suspended and he had been placed on 
probation. Although the statutes are not entirely consistent, the more consistent 
view is that an offender serving probation is not serving his sentence. Second, even 
if a probationer in good standing may be said to be serving his sentence, once a 
probation violation report is filed, the probationer ceases to be serving probation 
and thus cannot be said to be serving his sentence. 
Although our statutes do not use the term "probation" with precision, the more 
consistent view of the entire statutory scheme is that an offender on probation is not 
11 
serving his sentence. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (2) (c), "a court may sentence 
a person convicted of an offense... to probation.. ." This provision does imply that 
probation is a sentence, since an offender may be sentenced to it. On the other hand, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) defines probation in a manner that suggests otherwise: 
'"Probation7 is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or execution 
of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." This definition 
implies that probation is not a sentence, but very nearly its antithesis: suspension of 
a sentence. Probation is to a sentence as rest is to work. Similarly, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1 (2)(a) provides that "the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation . . . " Again, this 
provision implies that an offender serving probation is not serving his sentence, 
which is suspended during the period of probation. But" [t]he first rule of statutory 
construction is to read on." Oral argument, Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, ht tp:/ /www.oyez.org/cases/ 2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1368/argument/ 
(Ginsberg, J.) 
However unclear our statutory law may be on the question of whether a 
probationer in good standing is serving his sentence, it is explicit on one further 
point: once a probation violation report is filed, the probationer is no longer serving 
12 
even probation. The filing of the probation violation report tolls the running of the 
probationary period: 
The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by 
the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (11) (b). Since the probation period is tolled, time spent 
outside of confinement after the probation violation report is filed does not qualify 
as "service of time": 
Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having 
been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation 
term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the 
probation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (11)(a)(i). Thus, a probationer against whom a violation 
report is filed is no longer serving probation; a fortiori, he is not serving his sentence. 
That was precisely defendant's status at the time he was sentenced by Judge 
Atherton. He was on probation, but a probation violation report had been filed. In 
fact, two Progress/Violation Reports had been filed. Neither is date-stamped by the 
court clerk, but the sequence of events is evident. The first violation report is dated 
8 February 2004. (R. 27). The alleged violation was defendant's arrest in the robbery 
case. (Id.) According to page 8 of the district court docket (attached to the inside 
jacket of the pleadings file in the record on appeal) the warrant was recalled because 
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defendant was booked. The second Progress/Violation Report is dated 15 
September 2004. (R. 38). Its purpose was to update the court on the status of the 
robbery case. (Id.) It notes that defendant was convicted of the robberies on 16 
August 2004 and that his sentencing date "will be October 4, 2004 before Judge 
Judith S.H. Atherton." (Id.). 
Meanwhile, in the robbery case, defendant was indeed sentenced on 4 October 
2004. (Docket in case number 041901010 FS, attached as addendum D, at 8). As 
demonstrated above, that date fell after defendant was "charged with a probation 
violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation/7 § 77-18-1 (11) (a) (i). Thus, 
"[t]he running of the probation period [had been] tolled," § 77-18-1 (ll)(b), and that 
period" [did] not constitute service of time toward the total probation term" unless 
defendant was ultimately "exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation." § 77-18-
l(ll)(a)(i). He was not. (R. 42-43). Thus, at the time Judge Atherton sentenced 
defendant, he was not "already serving" his sentence in the theft case. 
Consequently, under section 76-3-401 (l)(b), Judge Atherton could not run his 
sentence in the robbery case consecutive to his sentence in the instant (theft) case. 
The first time defendant appeared before a judge while "already serving"' a 
sentence in another case was at his revocation hearing in the instant case. A 
probation revocation hearing was held on 6 December 2004. (R. 42). Defendant 
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admitted to having violated the terms of his probation. (Id.) Judge Reese revoked 
defendant's probation and ordered that "defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison/' (R. 43). The term was 
"ordered to run consecutive." (Id.). 
Defendant argues that Judge Reese lacked jurisdiction to make a concurrency 
determination at the time he revoked defendant's probation because his court—then 
presided over by his predecessor, Judge Noel —lost jurisdiction over defendant at 
the time he entered a legal sentence. Br. of Aplt. at 6. The court of appeals has 
indeed often stated that "[o]nce a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 
1991); see also Br. Aplt. at 6 (citing three court of appeals opinions). This assertion 
is true as far as it goes. 
However, the principle was expressed more precisely by then-Justice Durham 
in an earlier Anderson case: "The trial court loses all jurisdiction over persons 
sentenced to prison/' State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27,32 (Utah 1990) (Durham, Justice, 
concurring in the result) (emphasis added). Her point follows inexorably from the 
statutory declaration that "[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction over all 
probationers." § 77-18-1 (2)(b)(iii). Obviously, a district court cannot, upon placing 
a defendant on probation, simultaneously lose and retain jurisdiction. 
15 
Consequently, Judge Reese had not lost jurisdiction to determine concurrency prior 
to the probation revocation hearing. 
Defendant also argues that Judge Reese lacked jurisdiction to determine 
concurrency at the revocation hearing because his only choices under section 77-18-
l(12)(e)(iii) were to sentence defendant—an impossibility because defendant had 
already been sentenced at the time he was placed on probation —or to execute the 
sentence previously imposed. Br. Aplt. at 8. The statute, defendant notes, "does not 
allow for 'resentencing' . . ." Id. 
Defendant is correct that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (e)(iii) gives a judge two 
options when revoking probation: 
If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
Here, although Judge Reese did not employ statutory nomenclature, his actions are 
clear. He did not sentence defendant—Judge Noel had already done that—nor did 
he "resentence" defendant. Rather, he ordered execution of the sentence previously 
imposed. (See R. 55:18-19.) Having done so, he was required by law to "state on the 
record and indicate in the order of judgment and commitment . . . if the sentences 
before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences 
the defendant is already serving." § 76-3-401 (l)(b); see also § 76-3-401(4). Judge 
Reese did precisely this. He stated on the record and indicated in the order of 
16 
judgment and commitment that defendant's theft sentence was to run consecutively 
with the sentences defendant was already serving in the robbery case. (R. 42-43; 55: 
19). 
Although a concurrency order is a common feature of a judgment, sentence, 
and commitment, it is does not follow that a later determination that sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently amounts, as defendant suggests, to a 
"resentencing/7 As explained below, if a court fails in its obligation to make a 
required concurrency determination, the Board of Pardons and Parole will "request 
clarification from the court/' and the court must "enter a clarified order of 
commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or 
concurrently/7 §76-3-401(4). This is not a resentencing, but a clarification. Without 
it, the Board of Pardons and Parole is unable to calculate the amount of time an 
inmate must serve. 
B. Concerns of practicality and ripeness dictate that the question of 
concurrency should be determined only after the sentences in both 
cases have been executed. 
In the court of appeals, the majority and the dissent disagreed on which 
approach posed greater potential implementation problems: requiring the second 
judge to determine concurrency while a defendant is still on probation in the first 
case, or requiring the first judge to determine concurrency when he revokes 
17 
probation. The majority noted that "when Judge Atherton sought to impose the 
aggravated robbery sentences there was no sufficiently definite event for 
commencement of a consecutive order because it was not clear when or if the 
suspended theft sentence would be executed/' Anderson, 2007 UT App 68, % 12. The 
dissent dismissed this concern on the ground that "nothing in the record refers to 
any difficulty which may be encountered when determining how much time a 
defendant should serve." Id. at f 25 (Davis, J., dissenting). 
Citing Bird v. State, 2000 UT App 209U, defendant argues that "trial courts can 
and do order that a sentence be served with a previously imposed sentence of 
probation." Br. Aplt. at 15. Like the instant case, Bird involved a probationer who 
committed additional crimes while on probation. But unlike the instant case, in 
Bird the second judge ordered Bird's sentence to run consecutively to "any sentence 
imposed by Judge Harding following probation revocation." Bird, 2000 UT App 
209U, Tf 2 (unnumbered). However, the issue in that case was not which court 
should have decided concurrency. The principal issue was whether Bird's petition 
for postconviction relief was procedurally barred; the court of appeals held that it 
was. Id. at Tf 5 (unnumbered). In addition, the court of appeals held that the 
sentencing court in Bird did not abuse its discretion in view of the fact that it 
"imposed consecutive sentences only after consideration of the factors enumerated 
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in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999)." Id. In other words, the court of appeals 
acknowledged, but did not pass upon, the practice of the second court imposing a 
sentence consecutive to a term of probation. 
A similar case, but one where the district courts took the other course, is State 
v. Workman, 2007 UT App 199U. Like Bird and defendant here, Workman 
committed additional crimes while on probation. When the first court revoked 
probation, it ordered that Workman's sentences run consecutive to the sentence in 
the second case. Id. at f^ 2 (unnumbered). The question in Workman was whether, 
two years later, that court retained jurisdiction to modify the sentence to run the 
sentences concurrently. The court of appeals held that it did not. Id. at f 4. Thus 
the court of appeals acknowledged, but did not pass upon, the practice of the first 
court imposing a sentence consecutive to the second sentence. 
The Workman approach is correct. Until the first court actually revokes 
probation and executes the original sentence, the issue of concurrency is 
hypothetical; the second court's concurrency order must inevitably rest on a 
prediction of what the first court will do in its probation revocation hearing. The 
very language of Bird betrays this lack of ripeness: the second judge could only order 
Bird's sentence to run consecutively to "any sentence imposed by Judge Harding 
following probation revocation/' Bird, 2000 UT App 209U, f 2 (unnumbered). 
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Judge Harding had not yet revoked probation and executed Bird's sentence, nor was 
Judge Harding bound to do so. Although probation revocation was, of course, a 
near certainty, it was nevertheless a future event. The second district judge in Bird 
thus ordered Bird's sentence to run consecutively to the prison sentence that "might 
thereafter be imposed" by Judge Harding. State v. Bell, 631 P.2d 254,255 (Kan. 1981) 
(emphasis added). 
Also telling is the fact that the second district judge in Bird did not purport to 
run Bird's sentence consecutive to his term of probation, but to "any sentence 
imposed by Judge Harding following probation revocation." Bird, 2000 UT App 
209U, \ 2 (unnumbered). In other words, the very judge to whom defendant points 
as a model of his preferred approach did not view Bird's probation as a sentence; he 
was running his second sentence consecutively to whatever sentence Judge Harding 
might impose after revoking probation. 
In sum, the concurrency determination should not be made until two sentences 
have actually been executed; any earlier concurrency order entered in the second 
case must, as in Bird, be contingent upon the revocation of probation in the first case. 
The commonsense approach is thus to charge the judge revoking probation with the 
task of determining concurrency. 
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C. One court or the other must determine whether the sentences run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
The issue before this Court is whether, in a circumstance where a probationer 
commits a crime while on probation, the first court or the second court has 
jurisdiction to determine whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively. But 
whichever court this Court chooses to decide the question, one thing is clear: one 
court must decide. This is so for two reasons. 
First, both courts cannot decide. If both courts have jurisdiction to determine 
concurrency, the possibility of inconsistent orders arises. One judge could order the 
terms to run consecutively, while the other judge ordered them to run concurrently. 
Second, by statute a court must decide concurrency; the question cannot be left 
open. Utah's concurrent and consecutive sentencing statute used to include a 
presumption of concurrent sentencing, but that provision was removed by the 
Legislature in 2002. See 2002 Laws of Utah 419. The version of the statute in effect 
when defendant was sentenced by Judge Noel on 4 December 2003, and currently 
in effect, contains no such presumption. Instead, it specifies that when the written 
commitment order fails to designate concurrent or consecutive sentencing, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole must seek and the court must provide direction on whether 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently: 
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If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons 
and Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the 
request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (emphasis added). Accordingly, once a defendant 
arrives at the prison, if it is unclear from his sentences whether his prison terms are 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole must seek 
clarification and some court must give it. Contra State v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App 32, 
156 P.3d 839.3 
3
 Jaramillo was wrongly decided. It involved simultaneously imposed 
misdemeanor sentences. The majority held that "the determination of whether two 
simultaneously imposed sentences are to be served concurrently or consecutively 
is to be made at the time of sentencing, and may not be made for the first time upon 
the revocation of probation/' 2007 UT App 32, f 16. By reading the statutory scheme 
too narrowly, the Jaramillo majority put sentencing courts into a box with no way 
out. First, it ruled that "the concurrent or consecutive determination is one that 
must be made and imposed at the time of sentencing." Id. at % 14. Second, it 
acknowledged that if the court does not specify at sentencing whether sentences are 
to run consecutively or concurrently, it must clarify its judgment at the request of 
the Board of Pardons and Parole. Id. Third, it read the term "clarified order" so 
narrowly as to prevent the court from determining concurrency at that juncture if 
it had not already done so. Id. Finally, it recognized that Utah law no longer 
presumes sentences to run concurrently. Id. Read together, these rulings require 
that if a sentencing court fails to address the question of concurrency at sentencing, 
the sentences may not run consecutively or concurrently. Despite an exasperated 
concurring and dissenting opinion, 2007 UT App 32 at ^ 19-23 (Orme, J., 
concurring and dissenting), the majority offered no clue how a court should escape 
this Catch-22. This Court's decision in the instant case should resolve the dilemma. 
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Judge Reese has already specified that the sentences are to run consecutively. 
But if this Court determines that Judge Atherton should be the one to make this 
determination, the State requests that the Court specify in its opinion that the Board 
of Pardons should direct its inevitable request to her. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted o n ^ ' November 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General • 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for 
the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of 
judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each 
other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively 
with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, 
the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the 
later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the 
court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole 
shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall 
enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run 
consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided 
under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6) (a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty 
or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6) (a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
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(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the 
conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing 
by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6) (a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for 
a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as 
follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently 
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the 
longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any 
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under 
the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to 
a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the 
person is located. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
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77-18-1. Suspension of sentence -- Pleas held in abeyance — Probation — 
Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality — Terms 
and conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings 
— Electronic monitoring. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with 
a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided 
in Title 11
 f Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution 
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except 
in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private 
organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be 
based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of 
services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the 
Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review 
and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
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(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact 
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors 
or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B 
misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation 
report from the department or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement 
according to guidelines set in Section 77~38a-203 describing the effect of the crime 
on the victim and the victim's family. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of 
pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department 
regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(d) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender conducted 
under Section 77-18-1.1; and 
(ii) recommendations for treatment of the offender. 
(e) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any 
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are 
protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as 
provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, 
and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged 
inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved 
by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the 
attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten 
working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. 
If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make 
a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
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(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning 
the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be 
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require 
that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on 
probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any treatment 
program in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program is 
acceptable to the court; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by 
the department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail 
the court finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic 
monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in 
accordance with Title 77
 f Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; 
and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense 
if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational 
certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in 
Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
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(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined 
by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-
21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with 
Subsection (10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court 
or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or 
infractions. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable 
as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and 
continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the 
payment of the account receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of 
civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer 
responsibility to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or 
upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt 
Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when 
termination of supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete 
report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke 
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless 
the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning 
revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation 
or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
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(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of 
a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding 
that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized 
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that 
revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on 
the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show 
cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and 
shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he 
is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting 
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations 
are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant 
unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and 
present evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the 
court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence 
previously imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the 
Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the 
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superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court 
that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state 
hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic 
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, 
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-
403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a 
presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing 
pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the presentence investigation 
only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the 
disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or 
materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including 
statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the 
victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation 
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 
and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the 
department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may 
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring as described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate 
law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
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(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department 
of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the 
defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to 
the department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic 
monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the 
court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section 
either directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Amended by Chapter 218, 2007 General Session 
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Addendum B 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 031900326 FS 
Judge: ROBIN W. REESE 
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Defendant's Attorney(s): CORRY, C. BEVAN 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: October 12, 1984 
Video 
Tape Number: TAPE Tape Count: 10:21 
CHARGES 
-1. THEFT— 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/04/2003 Guilty 
HEARING 
-(amended) - 3rd Degree 
DEFT ADMITTS ALLEGATIONS 2 - 3 
DENIES ALLEGATION 1 - C/O STRICKEN ON STATE MOTION 
COURT ORDERED PROBATION REVOKED, DEFT TO SERVE PRISON TERM 
Page 1 
Case No: 031900326 
Date: Dec 06, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a 3rd Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COURT ORDERED TO RUN CONSECUTIVE 
Page 2 (last) 
Addendum C 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, and 
Cross-appellee, 
v. 
Darrell Dean Anderson, 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant. 
OPINION 
[For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20060099-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 20, 2007J 
2007 UT App 304 
Second District, Ogden Department, 031904234 
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant and Cross-appellee 
Merlin G. Calver and J. Keith Henderson, Ogden, for 
Appellee and Cross-appellant 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and McHugh. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Kl Defendant Darrell Dean Ande 
one count of simple assault and 
protective order, both class A m 
arguing that Defendant's convict 
third degree felonies. See Utah 
Defendant cross-appeals, arguing 
did not enhance Defendant's conv 
that Defendant's previous convic 
actually for domestic violence d 
also asserts that subsection (2) 
see id. § 30-6-1(2) (c) (2002), a 
overbroad. We affirm. 
rson was convicted by a jury of 
one count of violating a 
isdemeanors. The State appeals, 
ions should have been enhanced to 
Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1 (2002). 
that even though the trial court 
ictions, it erred in concluding 
tion for disorderly conduct was 
isorderly conduct. Defendant 
(c) of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, 
s applied to him, is vague and 
BACKGROUND 
H2 In August 2002, Defendant was charged with "D[omestic] 
V[iolence] disorderly conduct"1 after an altercation with his 
1. On the citation issued to Defendant, the officer handwrote 
the applicable violation as "D.V. Disorderly Conduct," a 
(continued. . . ) 
father-in-law. Defendant, acting pro se, entered a plea of no 
contest to disorderly conduct at a proceeding before Judge West. 
The plea was held in abeyance. The documents regarding 
Defendant's arraignment and his plea contain no reference to 
domestic violence; rather, they mention only disorderly conduct. 
For example, the minutes from Defendant's arraignment state that 
Defendant was charged with "Disorderly Conduct." Similarly, the 
minutes from Defendant's plea notice hearing state that Defendant 
entered a plea in abeyance for "Disorderly Conduct." 
[^3 About one year later, Defendant had some altercations with 
his wife and was subsequently charged with simple assault and 
violating a protective order, the domestic violence offenses at 
issue in this appeal.2 Judge Baldwin then revoked Defendant's 
plea in abeyance and entered a conviction for disorderly conduct. 
The minutes from the revocation hearing reflect the following: 
"Court enters the conviction of Disorderly Conduct, a class C 
misdemeanor,[3] and terminates jurisdiction. As the court file 
is unclear as to whether the defendant entered a plea to a 
domestic violence charge, conviction shall enter as to Disorderly 
Conduct." 
[^4 Based on Defendant's disorderly conduct conviction, the 
State enhanced Defendant's simple assault and violation of a 
protective order charges to third degree felonies. See id. 
§§ 77-36-1(2)(o) (2002), 77-36-1.1. Defendant filed a motion to 
quash the prior conviction, arguing that it was not for domestic 
violence, as required by the enhancement statute. See id. §§ 77-
36-1(2)(o), 77-36-1.1. Judge Dutson, the trial judge in this 
matter, initially agreed with Defendant, but after reviewing the 
transcripts from the revocation hearing, reversed his previous 
1. (...continued) 
violation of Utah Code section 76-9-102. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-9-102 (2003). Section 76-9-102 is titled "Disorderly 
Conduct" and does not refer to domestic violence. See id. 
Whether a conviction involves domestic violence is governed by 
Utah Code sections 77-36-1 and 30-6-1. See id. §§ 77-36-1 
(2002), 30-6-1 (2) - (3) (2002). 
2. Defendant was initially charged with several domestic 
violence offenses in two separate informations, one in August 
2003, and one in September 2003. At Defendant's request, his two 
cases were consolidated for trial, and the State filed the second 
of two amended informations in November 2005. Many of 
Defendant's original charges were dismissed and of those that 
went to trial, the two mentioned here are the only charges for 
which Defendant was convicted. 
3. Despite this statement, the conviction was actually entered 
as a class A misdemeanor. 
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ruling. Defendant filed a petition for interlocutory review, 
which this court denied. 
f5 The case proceeded to a jury trial, and on the morning of 
trial, Defendant filed a motion to reduce all of the enhanced 
charges to misdemeanors, again on the basis that Defendant did 
not have a prior domestic violence conviction. The trial court 
denied Defendant's motion, and Defendant stipulated to the prior 
conviction as one involving domestic violence on the condition 
that he could preserve his right to appeal the trial court's 
decision. 
11 j The jury convicted Defendant of one count of simple assault 
and one count of violating a protective order, both of which had 
been enhanced to third degree felonies.4 After trial, Defendant 
filed a motion to reduce his convictions on the same grounds that 
he had previously advanced. The trial court ordered briefing on 
the issue and held an evidentiary hearing. Ruling from the 
bench, the trial court determined that even though Defendant's 
previous conviction "clearly" involved domestic violence, it did 
not qualify as an enhancing offense under Utah Code section 77-
36-1(2) (o). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1 (2) (o) . Accordingly, 
the trial court reduced Defendant's convictions to class A 
misdemeanors. 
|^7 The State appeals, asserting that Defendant's disorderly 
conduct conviction required the trial court to enhance 
Defendant's convictions to felonies. Defendant cross-appeals, 
arguing that although his convictions were not enhanced, the 
trial court erred in finding that Defendant's previous conviction 
was for domestic violence disorderly conduct. Defendant also 
asserts that Utah Code section 30-36-1(2)(c), see id. § 30-36-
1(2)(c), as applied to him, is vague and overbroad. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[^8 The State argues that Defendant's prior conviction for 
disorderly conduct qualifies as a domestic violence offense under 
Utah Code section 77-36-1 (2) (o) , thereby requiring the trial 
court to enhance Defendant's current convictions. See id. §§ 77-
36-1(2) (o), 77-36-1.1. "The proper interpretation and 
application of a statute is a question of law which we review for 
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal 
4. Defendant was acquitted on one count of simple assault, and 
the jury hung on three remaining counts of violating a protective 
order. 
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conclusion." Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 
1998) .5 
ANALYSIS 
I. Defendant's Prior Conviction for Disorderly Conduct 
%9 The State argues that the trial court erred in reducing 
Defendant's convictions to class A misdemeanors because 
Defendant's disorderly conduct conviction is a qualifying 
domestic violence offense under the applicable enhancement 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1.1. Section 77-36-1.1 
dictates that a domestic violence charge may be enhanced to a 
felony if the defendant has been convicted of a domestic violence 
offense within five years of another "qualifying domestic 
violence offense." Id. Utah Code section 77-36-1(2) (subsection 
(2)) defines a qualifying domestic violence offense as 
any criminal offense involving violence or 
physical harm or threat of violence or 
physical harm, . . . when committed by one 
cohabitant[6] against another. "Domestic 
violence" also means commission or attempt to 
commit, any of the following offenses by one 
cohabitant against another: (a) aggravated 
assault . . . ; (b) assault . . . ; (c) 
criminal homicide . . . ; (d) harassment 
. . . ; [and] (o) disorderly conduct, as 
defined in Section 76-9-102, if a conviction 
of disorderly conduct is the result of a plea 
agreement in which the defendant was 
originally charged with any of the domestic 
violence offenses otherwise described in this 
Subsection (2). 
Id. § 77-36-1(2) (emphasis added). 
[^10 The trial court determined that Defendant's disorderly 
conduct conviction did not qualify as a domestic violence offense 
because it did not result from "a plea agreement in which . . . 
[D]efendant was originally charged with any of the domestic 
5. Our resolution of this issue obviates the need to address the 
issues raised on cross-appeal. 
6. "Cohabitant" is defined as "a person who is 16 years of age 
or older who: . . . (c) is related by blood or marriage to the 
other party." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(2) (2002); see also id. 
§ 77-36-1(1) ("'Cohabitant' has the same meaning as in Section 
3 0-6-1.") . 
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violence offenses otherwise described in . . . subsection (2)." 
Id. The State asserts that this determination was error for two 
reasons. First, the State argues that to qualify as a domestic 
violence offense, Defendant's disorderly conduct conviction need 
not result from a plea agreement in which Defendant was 
originally charged with one of the offenses enumerated in 
subsection (2). Second, and in the alternative, the State 
asserts that Defendant's disorderly conduct conviction falls 
within the statute's more expansive definition of a domestic 
violence offense: "[A]ny criminal offense involving violence or 
physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm . . . , when 
committed by one cohabitant against another." Id. The 1- 1 i =\1 
court rejected these same arguments, stating, 
[U]nder the [enhancement] statute as 
presently adopted, even though a Disorderly 
Conduct-Domestic Violence occur [red] , the 
clear language of subsection (o) prevents 
this Court from considering it as an 
enhancing offense. This is because the 
legislature has quite illogically determined 
that disorderly conduct must be reduced down 
from a higher charged offense to qualify. It 
is certainly not consistent with what would 
seem to be the purpose of the enhancement 
statute, hut that is how it is presently 
drafted. 
Kll When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain 
language to determine its meaning. See Utah State Tax Comm'n v. 
Stevenson, 2006 UT 84,^32, 150 P.3d 521. "Only when we find that 
a statute is ambiguous do we look to other interpretive tools." 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). While examining a 
statute's plain language, we do so under the presumption that the 
"legislature used each term advisedly." State v. Maestas, 2002 
UT 123,^52, 63 P.3d 621 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"It is an elementary rule of construction 
that effect must be given, if possible, to 
every word, clause and sentence of a statute 
. . . . No clause [,] sentence or word shall 
be construed as superfluous, void or 
7. At Defendant's evidentiary hearing, the trial court asked the 
State how it should "get around the if" in subsection (2): 
"You're saying [the legislature] should put a period after 
disorderly conduct as defined in Section 76-9-102, period, then 
capital if?" The State responded, "Yeah. I mean obviously . . . 
basically that's what I'm saying. Even if you've got all these 
commas, because I am not sure what all of these commas are 
supposed to mean." 
20060099-CA 5 
insignificant if the construction can be 
found which will give force to and preserve 
all the words of the statute." 
Id. at |^53 (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 46:06 (4th ed. 1984)). Moreover, "[o]ur task is 
to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to correct or 
revise them. When the words are clear, however incongruous they 
may appear in policy application, we will interpret them as 
written, leaving to the legislature the task of making 
corrections when warranted." State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86,1(9, 
150 P.3d 540. 
H12 Thus, we begin with the plain language of the statute. 
Subsection (2) first states that "'domestic violence' means any 
criminal offense involving violence or physical harm or threat of 
violence or physical harm . . . when committed by one cohabitant 
against another." Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(2). Subsection (2) 
further states that domestic violence "also means" one of several 
enumerated offenses including, inter alia, battery, assault, 
homicide, harassment, etc., when committed by one cohabitant 
against another. Id. Finally, subsection (2) states that 
disorderly conduct also qualifies as a domestic violence offense 
"if a conviction of disorderly conduct is the result of a plea 
agreement in which the defendant was originally charged with any 
of the domestic violence offenses otherwise described in this 
subsection (2)." Id. § 77-36-1(2)(o) (emphasis added). Relying 
on the plain language of subsection (o), we conclude, contrary to 
the State's assertion, that a conviction for disorderly conduct 
qualifies as a domestic violence offense only if the defendant 
was first charged with any of the more serious crimes listed in 
subsection (2), and then pleaded to the lesser offense of 
disorderly conduct. Any other reading would negate the presence 
of the word "if" in the statute, which this court is not 
permitted to do. See Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at ^52. 
Hl3 The State also argues, in the alternative, that Defendant's 
conviction should fall under the catch-all phrase, "any 
conviction involving violence between one cohabitant against 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-1(2). However, this argument 
is inconsistent with the rule of statutory construction dictating 
that the more specific provision in subsection (o) prevails over 
the more general. "[W]hen two statutory provisions conflict in 
their operation, the provision more specific in application 
governs over the more general provision." Thomas v. Color 
Country Mgrnt. , 2004 UT 12, 1[9, 84 P. 3d 1201. Adhering to this 
rule of statutory construction, it appears that the legislature 
expressly limited disorderly conduct convictions for purposes of 
enhancement to those that result from a guilty plea after the 
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defendant was originally charged with one of the crimes 
enumerated in subsection (2). The State, nevertheless, argues 
that this construction is inconsistent with the statute's overall 
purpose of deterring domestic violence. This argument results in 
an inconsistency between the more general language of subsection 
(2) and the more specific language of subsection (o). Given this 
inconsistency, we look to legislative history to resolve the 
ambiguity. See Utah State Tax Comm'n v. Stevenson, 2006 UT 
84,^32, 150 P.3d 521. Such history reveals that the legislature 
intended to add disorderly conduct as a domestic violence offense 
only when it resulted from a plea agreement after a defendant was 
charged with one of the crimes enumerated in subsection (2). 
[^14 Subsection (o) was added to section 77-36-1 in 1999. See 
1999 Utah Laws Ch. 229 § 1. There was no debate when the 
amendment was adopted, only the following description offered by 
Representative Goodfellow, the bill's author: 
[H]ouse bill 240 has to do with domestic 
violence, and let me first of all try to 
explain the problem that we're trying to 
correct. When someone who's been charged 
with domestic violence under one or more of 
the elements as defined on lines 17-38, by 
the time they go to court, they often are 
plea bargained down to disorderly conduct. 
However, disorderly conduct is not part of 
the domestic violence part of the code. 
Therefore at a future time when someone 
. . . then tries to get a protective order 
they can't because this is not under the 
domestic violence part of the code. And so 
the attempt here is to bring the domestic 
violence or the disorderly conduct under the 
domestic violence . . . part of the code but 
only after someone has been charged with one 
of the elements of the domestic violence code 
then when it's plea bargained down to 
disorderly] c [onduct] that becomes part of 
the d[omestic] v[iolence] part. 
House Floor Debate, Utah State Legislature, 1999 Gen. Leg. Sess., 
Rep. Goodfellow, Feb. 9, 1999. (Emphasis added.) This comment 
clarifies that the legislature intended to limit the effect of 
disorderly conduct convictions on subsequent domestic violence 
convictions. The legislature apparently determined that 
disorderly conduct convictions other than those resulting from a 
plea agreement after an original charge of one of the crimes 
enumerated in subsection (o) did not warrant enhancement of a 
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subsequent domestic violence conviction. Accordingly, because 
Defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct did not arise in 
the specific manner described in subsection (o), we affirm the 
trial court's decision to reduce Defendant's convictions to class 
A misdemeanors. 
II. Cross-Appeal 
fl5 This determination renders Defendant's arguments raised on 
cross-appeal moot. 
The function of appellate courts, like 
that of courts generally, is not to give 
opinions on merely abstract or theoretical 
matters, but only to decide actual 
controversies injuriously affecting the 
rights of some party to the litigation, and 
it has been held that questions or cases 
which have become moot or academic are not a 
proper subject to review. 
McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974) (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant asserts 
that the trial court erred in finding that his disorderly conduct 
conviction involved domestic violence and that the term 
cohabitant, as applied to him, is vague and overbroad. These 
issues are moot because the trial court's finding of fact had no 
legal effect on Defendant's rights, and Defendant's convictions 
were not enhanced as a result of the disorderly conduct 
conviction involving his father-in-law. Thus, the points 
Defendant takes issue with do not relate to an "actual 
controvers[y] injuriously affecting" Defendant's rights, and the 
issues are therefore moot. Id. Accordingly, we decline to 
further address them. 
CONCLUSION 
^16 We affirm the trial court's order reducing Defendant's 
convictions to class A misdemeanors because Defendant's 
disorderly conduct conviction did not result from a plea 
agreement reducing his charges from one of the crimes enumerated 
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in Utah Code section 77-36-1(2). We decline to address 
Defendant's claims raised on cross-appeal because they are moot 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
111 ; WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
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Addendum D 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
CASE NUMBER' 041901010 State Felony 
Defendants TIMOTHY J AUKUSITINO, DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON, RYAN 
DANIEL BINKS, JOSHUA FUNGALEI LOLOHEA, are linked. 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 7 6-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
'Plea: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Charge 2 - 76-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Guilty 
Charge 3 - 7 6-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 4 - 76-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 5 - 7 6-6-302' - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 6 - 7 6-6-302 - AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
Charge 7 - 76-8-306 - OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: May 10, 2004 Not Guilty 
Disposition: August 16, 2004 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
Represented by: L BRUCE LARSEN 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
Also Known As - " D-BOY " 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION • 
Defendant Name: DAVID SCOTT ANDERSON 
Offense tracking number: 1610 9357 
Date of Birth: October 12, 1984 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: MIDVALE CITY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 04-003095 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: 04002456 
Sheriff Office Number: 0269968 
Violation Date: February 08, 2004 6885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 340.50 
Amount Paid: : 340.50 
Credit: .'.- 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: REPORTER FEES 
Amount Due: 325.50. 
Amount Paid: . 325.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: ; 15.00 
":'"'•' Amount Paid: 15.00 • 
Amount Credit: 0.00 ' 
Balance: / 0.00 
CASE NOTE 
DA 04002456 
PROCEEDINGS 
02-12-04 Judge PAUL G MAUGHAN assigned. 
02-12-04 Note: CASE FILED BY DET. ARGUETA OF MIDVALE POLICE DEFT IN JAIL 
WILL FAX WARRANT TO THE JAIL 
02-12-04 Case filed 
02-12-04 Filed: Information 
02-17-04 Note: Jim from Pre-Trial Services notified clerk defendant's 
Attorney Bruce Larsen request initial appearance of 2/19/04 
02-17-04 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on February 19, 2004 at 09:00 AM 
in Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
02-17-04 Note: Judge reassigned from criminal filing screen due to new 
procedure for roll calls. 
02-17-04 Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON assigned. 
02-19-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: ANN BOYDEN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynettm 
Prosecutor: CHRISTENSEN, VIRGINIA 0 
Defendant 
Video 
Tape Number: DISK 43 Tape Count: 93232 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 02/26/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
02-19-04 ROLL CALL scheduled on February 26, 2004 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge MAUGHAN. 
02-19-04 Filed: Notice of Appearance of Counsel filed by L Bruce Larsen, 
Attorney for Defendant 
02-19-04 Filed: Pequest for Discovery filed by L Bruce Larsen, Attorney 
for Defendant 
02-23-04 Note: Bail remain $250,007 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on March 11, 2004 at 09:00 AM in 
Third Floor - W37 with Judge MAUGHAN. 
02-26-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, JOHN K 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Count: off record 
HEARING 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
COUNT: off record 
Court Orders Case set for Preliminary Hearing 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/25/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W39 
Before Judge: BURTON, MICHAEL K. 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing Cancelled scheduled for: 3/11/04 
Reason: Counsel's request. 
02-26-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on March 25, 2D04 at 02:00 PM in 
Third Floor - W39 with Judge BURTON. 
02-26-04 Note: ROLL CALL minutes modified. 
03-04-04 Filed: FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
03-25-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on April 01, 2D04 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - S41 with Judge MCCLEVE. 
03-25-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Reporter: SCHULTZ, KATHLEEN 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
HEARING 
The State's motion to continue is granted. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/01/2004 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S41 
Before Judge: MCCLEVE, SHEILA K. 
04-01-04 Preliminary Hearing scheduled on April 22, 2004 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W4 6 with Judge LINDBERG. 
04-01-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: SHEILA K. MCCLEVE 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lauraj 
Reporter: WARNICK, SUZANNE 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/1/04 Tape Count: 2:26:28 
HEARING 
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C/0 SET FOR PRELIM 4/22/04 AT 2PM BEFORE JUDGE LINDBERG. COUNSELS 
ADVISED THE COURT THAT IS WILL BE A 3-HOUR SETTING WITH 8 WITNESSES 
AND 4 CO-DEFTS. 
04-07-04 Filed: letter from the defendant 
04-22-04 Note: Case Bound Over 
04-22-04 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on May 10, 2004 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
04-22-04 Note: INCOURT NOTE minutes modified. 
04-22-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Preliminary Hearing 
Judge: DENISE P LINDBERG 
Clerk: valerieb 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
HEARING 
TAPE: 4/22/04 COUNT: 2:55 
witness' sworn 
COUNT: 2:56 
on the motion of the State, court ordered witnesses excluded 
COUNT: 2:56 
States witness Jose Argeta sworn and examined 
COUNT: 3:02 
States exhibit #9,10 & 11 MOA 
COUNT: 3:04 
State's exhibits 1 - 7 MOA 
COUNT: 3:14 
State's exhibit 8 <OA 
COUNT: 3:17 
Cross by Larsen 
COUNT: 3:20 
Cross by O'Connell 
COUNT: 3:20 
witness excused 
COUNT: 3:21 
State's witness Ryan Binks previously sworn and examined 
COUNT: 4:13 
Cross by Larsen 
COUNT: 4:13 
recess 
COUNT: 4:21 
in session 
COUNT: 4:26 
Cross by O'Connell 
COUNT: 4:33 
cross by Simms 
COUNT: 4:40 
state rests 
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COUNT: 4:40 
all defendant's advised of their rights and waive the right to 
testify 
COUNT: 4:41 
the court finds probable cause to bind this matter over 
the defendant was transported from the ADC 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 
5/10/04 at 8:30 AM in courtroom S44 before Judge JUDITH S ATHERTON. 
05-0 6-04 Filed: LETTER TO COURT FROM DEFENDANT 
05-10-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 9:08 
ARRAIGNMENT 
The Information is read. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 08/16/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/24/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/25/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
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Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 08/26/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
05-10-04 FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on August 16, 2004 at 08:30 
AM in Fourth Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 24, 2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S44 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 25, 2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
05-10-04 JURY TRIAL scheduled on August 26, 2004 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
07-02-04 Filed: Transcript of preliminary hearing dated 4-22-04, Suzanne 
Warnick, Court Reporter 
07-16-04 Filed: Third supplemental response to request for discovery 
08-16-04 JURY TRIAL Cancelled. 
Reason: Case has been settled. 
08-16-04 SENTENCING scheduled on October 04, 2004 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - S4 4 with Judge ATHERTON. 
Disposition is Guilty 
Disposition is Guilty 
Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition is Dismissed 
08-16-04 Charge 7 Disposition is Dismissed 
08-16-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 11:23 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
08-
08-
08-
08-
08-
08-
-16-
-16-
-16-
-16-
-16-
-16-
-04 
-04 
-04 
-04 
-04 
-04 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
Charge 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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http://xchange.utcourts.gov/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=caseHist 11/3/2007 
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The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 10/04/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - S44 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
10-01-04 Filed: RECEIVED PSR FROM APAP 
10-04-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lorip 
Prosecutor: KNELL, BRADLEY J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARSEN, L. BRUCE 
Video 
Tape Number: VIDEO Tape Count: 10:27 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than six years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
COMMITMENTS TO RUN CONCURRENT. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
COURT RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR 239 DAYS TIME SERVED. 
COURT ALSO RECOMMENDS DEFT RECEIVE MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION AND 
TREATMENT. RESTITUTION TO BE DETERMINED BY BOARD OF PARDONS. 
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CASE NUMBER 041901010 State Felony 
10-13-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 325.50 
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10-13-04 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 325.50 
Note: REPORTER FEES 
05-04-05 Note: SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT minutes modified. 
06-17-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
06-17-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
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